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Abstract
This paper studies scal federalism when voter information varies across regions.
We develop a model of political agency with heterogeneously informed voters. Rent-
seeking politicians provide public goods to win the votes of the informed. As a result,
rent extraction is lower in regions with higher information. In equilibrium, electoral
discipline has decreasing returns. Thus, political centralization e¢ ciently reduces ag-
gregate rent extraction. The model predicts that a regions benets from centralization
are decreasing in its residentsinformation. We test this prediction using panel data
on pollutant emissions across U.S. states. The 1970 Clean Air Act centralized environ-
mental policy at the federal level. In line with our theory, we nd that centralization
induced a di¤erential decrease in pollution for uninformed relative to informed states.
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1 Introduction
The most dramatic episode of centralization undertaken by the U.S. federal government
achieved a striking decrease in corruption. The New Deal, by introducing federal oversight
of welfare spending, eradicated the patronage and political manipulation that had hitherto
characterized relief programs managed at the state and local level (Wallis 2000a, b; Wallis,
Fishback, and Kantor 2006). International evidence highlights similar instances of a pos-
itive impact of political centralization on government accountability. Centralized political
institutions in precolonial Africa reduced corruption and fostered the rule of law, causing
a long-lasting increase in the provision of public goods that endured into the postcolonial
period (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007a,b). Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue that China
has grown faster than Russia thanks to the greater strength of its central government com-
pared to local politicians. While contemporary cross-country studies of decentralization and
perceived corruption have yielded conicting results (Treisman 2007; Fan, Lin, and Treis-
man 2009), it is clear empirically that centralization can increase government e¢ ciency and
political accountability, at least under the appropriate conditions.
This phenomenon is di¢ cult to understand through the lens of traditional models of scal
federalism. Oatess (1972, 1999) classic theory does not consider the problem of imperfectly
accountable politicians and posits two technological rationales for centralization: economies
of scale and benets from policy coordination. The subsequent literature in political economy
has mostly emphasized the advantages of decentralization (Lockwood 2006). In particular,
decentralized government is held to be more accountable, thanks to yardstick competition
across local jurisdictions (Besley and Case 1995; Besley and Smart 2007).1
In this paper, on the other hand, we explain how centralization can in fact enhance ac-
countability. Our approach reects for electoral incentives the fundamental intuition of gains
from trade between heterogeneous agents. Voters in di¤erent regions are unequally capa-
ble of incentivizing self-interested politicians. If the regions are united in a single national
polity, the central politician is mainly held accountable by the most capable voters. Hence,
his incentives and performance are better than those of the average local politician.
We capture this idea through a model of political agency with imperfectly informed voters.
Selsh politicians are entrusted with allocating the government budget between public goods
and wasteful private rents. Career concerns induce the incumbent to provide a positive
amount of public goods in order to signal ability and win the votes of those citizens who
observe public good provision. In equilibrium, we show that politicians extract lower rents
1Conversely, the central government could be less susceptible to capture by special interest groups. How-
ever, formal analysis of this possibility has reached ambiguous conclusions (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000,
2006).
2
if voters are better informed, consistent with the evidence that voter information improves
accountability (Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Snyder and Strömberg
2010; Ponzetto 2011). Electoral discipline has decreasing returns because the threat of being
ousted from o¢ ce is less costly when rent extraction is already low. National elections,
therefore, provide much better incentives and screening than local elections in the least
informed regions, and not much worse than in the most informed ones. Centralization then
increases overall e¢ ciency by reducing aggregate political rents.
Our model predicts the regional distribution of the e¢ ciency gains from centralization.
The central government sets a uniform national policy that entails an identical level of
public good provision throughout the country (Oates 1972; Alesina and Spolaore 1997). As
a consequence, all regions whose residents have below-average political information derive a
strict welfare increase from a switch from decentralized to centralized government. The net
impact on better informed regions is instead ambiguous. The average information exploited
in electing their rulers falls when they join the less informed parts of the union in a national
election. This dilution tends to reduce accountability. On the other hand, if public goods spill
over across regions, we show that all voters are keener on the ability of a central than a local
politician. This keenness makes national elections more competitive, raising accountability.
While the most informed regions may gain or lose from centralization, our theory entails
an unambiguous relative prediction. A regions welfare gains from centralization are strictly
decreasing in its residentsinformation.
We test this prediction of our model using panel data on air pollutant emissions across
U.S. states. This series enables us to study the e¤ects of one of the most prominent instances
of centralization in U.S. history since World War II (Greenstone 2004). With the 1970 Clean
Air Act Amendments, the federal government took direct responsibility for air pollution reg-
ulation, which until that point had rested primarily with states and local governments. We
perform a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis to assess whether the federal takeover of environ-
mental policy had a di¤erential impact on states according to their level of information.
The empirical evidence supports our theoretical prediction. The introduction of federal
standards is associated with a highly signicant di¤erential trend. After 1970, pollutant
emissions begin to decline markedly in less informed states relative to more informed ones.
The nding obtains for di¤erent recorded emissions, and it is robust to specications that
control for simultaneous di¤erences-in-di¤erences based on other potential determinants of
pollution, such as income per capita or the size of the manufacturing sector. In line with our
theory, the di¤erential reduction in emissions seems to represent a benet of centralization for
the less informed, since we do not observe a simultaneous di¤erential reduction in economic
activity.
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Both theoretically and empirically, we nd that centralization entails systematic distri-
butional consequences that favor regions with less informed voters, whose local government
is more dysfunctional. This pattern contrasts with Strömbergs (2004) nding that dis-
cretionary New Deal spending was disproportionately allocated to more informed counties
within a state. We conclude by showing that a natural extension of our theoretical framework
encompasses and interprets the two opposite phenomena. Under centralization, uniformly
provided public goods such as national emission standards benet the less informed; con-
versely, discretionary funds are targeted to the more informed. Our theory highlights the
importance of striking a balance between the two. Without any uniformity, centralization
would be welfare reducing despite the associated reduction in political rents. When instead
uniform and discretionary items are in the right proportions, centralization is not only welfare
increasing but also Pareto e¢ cient.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 Public Good Provision and Political Agency
The economy is populated by innitely lived agents, whose preferences are separable over
time and quasilinear across a set of public goods p = 1; :::; P . Individual i in period t derives
utility
uit = ~u
i
t +
PX
p=1
ip log gp;t, (1)
where ~uit is utility from private consumption, and gp;t the provision of public good p. The
relative importance of each good for individual i is described by the shares ip  0 such thatPP
p=1 
i
p = 1. We focus on public-good provision, treating ~u
i
t as an exogenous shock.
Public goods are provided by a politician who allocates a given government budget b,
invariant over time and subject to a balanced-budget constraint every period. Expenditure
on each public good p is xp;t, and residually the politician can extract an unproductive private
rent rt  0. Thus
rt +
PX
p=1
xp;t = b. (2)
The politicians objective is to maximize rent extraction over his term in o¢ ce. His discount
factor is  2 (0; 1].
For a given level of spending, public goods are produced with technology
gp;t = e
p;txp;t. (3)
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Productivity p;t represents the stochastic competence of the politician in providing good p.
It is independent across public goods, and follows a rst-order moving average process
p;t = "p;t + "p;t 1. (4)
The shocks "p;t are independent and identically distributed across policies, over time, and
across politicians. They have support ["; "^], mean zero and variance 2.
Within each period t, events unfold according to the following timeline.
1. The incumbent politicians past competence shock "t 1 becomes common knowledge.
2. The incumbent chooses expenditures xt, and residually rent rt, without knowing the
realization of his period-t competence shock "t.
3. "t is realized and the provision of public goods gt is determined.
4. Each voter i observes the provision gp;t of public good p with probability i; with prob-
ability 1 i he remains completely uninformed about gp;t.2 The arrival of information
is independent across voters. No voter can have any direct observation of "t, rt, or xp;t
for any p.
5. An election is held, pitting the incumbent against a single challenger, randomly drawn
from the same pool of potential o¢ ce-holders.
The electorate consists of a continuum of atomistic voters. It can be partitioned into J
internally homogeneous groups. Group j comprises a fraction j of voters, who have identical
preferences jp, and identical probabilities j of information acquisition.
Each voters political preferences consist of two independent elements, following the
probabilistic-voting approach (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). First, agents have preferences
Euit+1 over the provision of public goods they expect from either politician in the following
period. Given information 
it, individual i has policy preferences
i
 

it
  E" PX
p=1
ip
 
log gIp;t+1   log gCp;t+1
 j
it
#
, (5)
where gIp;t+1 denotes public-good provision if the incumbent is re-elected, and g
C
p;t+1 if the
challenger defeats him. In addition, voters have preferences for candidatesnon-policy char-
acteristics, such as their likability or the ideology of their party. Thus voter i votes for the
2This is not inconsistent with knowledge of ones own utility uit. The exogenous component ~u
i
t may
include a stochastic shock, and uninformed voters are unable to distinguish between the e¤ects of the shock
and those of gp;t.
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incumbent if and only if
i
 

it
  	t +  it, (6)
where 	t and  
i
t are independent draws from common-knowledge probability distributions.
The common shock 	t to the incumbents popularity accounts for the aggregate uncertainty
in the electoral outcome. The idiosyncratic shock  it to each voters tastes provides the
intensive margin of political support, and is i.i.d. across agents. Both variables have uniform
distributions with supports respectively [ 1= (2) ; 1= (2)] and   ;  , su¢ ciently wide
that neither any voters ballot nor the outcomes of the election are perfectly predictable on
the basis of policy considerations alone.
Assumption 1 The support of the electoral shocks 	t and  it is su¢ ciently wide, and that
of the competence shocks "p;t su¢ ciently narrow, that
1
2
    " < "^     1
2
and   1
2
 " < "^  1
2
,
where
 =
XJ
j=1
jj.
2.2 Voter Information and Government Accountability
The incumbents and the challengers competence shocks are known to be independent draws
from a common distribution. Moreover, voters have rational expectations that any politician
in every period will choose the same allocation x, because the environment is stationary and
performance is separable in e¤ort and ability. Voter is information is described by the set

it of public goods p whose provision gp;t he has observed. These observations allow him to
infer the incumbents competence p;t, whereas he has no information about the challenger.
His policy preferences are
i
 

it

=
X
p2
it
ipE ("p;tjgp;t) =
X
p2
it
ip (log gp;t   log xp   "p;t 1) . (7)
Each group j comprises a continuum of agents and the arrival of information is inde-
pendent across agents, so a share j of its member have observed public-good provision gp;t,
while the remainder 1   j have not. Given the independent realizations of the uniform
idiosyncratic shock  i, the share of members of group j who vote for the incumbent is
vjt =
1
2
+
1
2 
"
j
PX
p=1
jp (log gp;t   log xp   "p;t 1) 	t
#
, (8)
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conditional on the realizations of gt and 	t. Taking into account the uniform aggregate
shock 	t, the incumbents probability of re-election is
 (xt) =
1
2
+ 
JX
j=1
jj
PX
p=1
jp (log xp;t   log xp) (9)
as a function of his policy choices xt (and residually rt).
The politician understands that if he is re-elected he will have further occasions to extract
rents. Denote by R their expected present value. The trade-o¤ between current and future
rent extraction leads to policy choices
x = arg max
xt
(
b 
PX
p=1
xp;t +R (xt)
)
, (10)
namely
xp = R
JX
j=1
jj
j
p for all p = 1; :::; P , (11)
and thus current rent extraction
r = b  R. (12)
In equilibrium, the probability of re-election is 1=2, because the politician does not have
private information at the time of the policy choice, voters have rational expectations, and
their non-policy tastes do not have a permanent bias against incumbency nor in its favor.
As a consequence, the present value of re-election is
R = 
1X
t=0


2
t
r =
2
2   r. (13)
Substituting this relationship into equations 11 and 12, solving the latter, and plugging it into
the former, we obtain the equilibrium allocation of the government budget. To economize
on notation, we dene
~  
2   2 (0; 1] , (14)
a convenient rescaling of the politicians discount factor.
Finally, rational expectations imply that the incumbent is re-elected if and only if
	t 
JX
j=1
jj
PX
p=1
jp"p;t. (15)
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Let t be an indicator variable for this condition. The competence of ruling politicians
evolves according to
^t = t 1
 
"It 1 + "
I
t

+
 
1  t 1
  
"Ct 1 + "
C
t

, (16)
where the superscripts I and C refer to the incumbent and challenger in the election at the
end of period t  1. The unconditional expectation of ability is then
E^p;t = E
 
t 1"p;t 1

. (17)
This completes the characterization of the stationary equilibrium of our model of political
career concerns.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, a politician with budget b extracts rent r = b, with rent
extraction
 

1 + 2~
 1
He sets expenditure on the provision of public good p to xp = p (1  ) b, with relative shares
p 
JX
j=1
j
j

jp.
His expected ability at providing public good p is
E^p = 2
XJ
j=1
jj
j
p.
An increase in 
PJ
j=1 jj
j
p induces an increase in ^p in the sense of rst-order stochastic
dominance.
Equilibrium rents are proportional to the government budget b. Rent extraction declines
as voters are more informed (@=@ < 0), since information allows them to monitor the
politician more tightly. This result accords with the empirical nding that government
performance improves with media scrutiny (Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2008;
Snyder and Strömberg 2010; Ponzetto 2011), as well as with votershuman capital (Glaeser
and Saks 2006) and social capital (Nannicini et al. 2010), which facilitate respectively the
acquisition and the sharing of information. Rents are also reduced when voters are more
likely to be swayed by policy than non-policy considerations (@=@ < 0). Finally, rent
extraction declines when politicians are more patient (@=@ < 0), because they are more
willing to sacrice current benets for a higher probability of remaining in o¢ ce in the future.
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Intuitively, it is impossible for rents to fall to zero, since the politicians incentive to refrain
from appropriating the entire current budget is entirely due to his desire to gain reelection and
keep pocketing future rents. More broadly, reductions in rent extraction through electoral
discipline become progressively more di¢ cult as the equilibrium rent declines. All rent-
decreasing factors, namely information , competitiveness , and patience , have positive
but decreasing returns (@2=@2 > 0, @2=@2 > 0, @2=@2 > 0).
The same factors that make elections a better incentive device also make them a better
screening mechanism. The average productivity of government spending is proportional to
the variance of the underlying distribution of ability (2), which measures the gains available
from screening. The e¤ectiveness of screening rises when voters are more informed about
public-good provision (@E^p=@j > 0), and thus have the ability to cast their ballots on
the basis of a signal of the incumbents skill. Moreover, screening is more e¤ective when
citizens are more willing to vote on the basis of observed performance, rather than out of
idiosyncratic non-policy tastes (@E^p=@ > 0). These e¤ects raise not only the expectation
of ability, but its entire distribution, in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
Through improvements in both political incentives and political selection, higher voter
information () increases the equilibrium welfare of each voter, which is given by
Euj =
PX
p=1
jpE log gp;t = log b+ log (1  ) +
PX
p=1
jp
 
E^p + log p

(18)
for each member of group j. Welfare also rises with voterskeenness on policy outcomes (),
politicianspatience (), and the variance of their ability distribution (2).
The allocation of spending across public goods () reects both di¤erences in preferences
and di¤erences in information. A utilitarian social welfare planner would set budget shares
p = p 
XJ
j=1
j
j
p, (19)
reecting average preferences for each public good. However, the politician is only imper-
fectly accountable, and specically he is only held accountable by informed voters. Thus
his choices deviate from social welfare optimization even beyond the extraction of a rent.
The allocation of expenditure across public goods obey a weighted social welfare function in
which each groups preferences are is weighted by its level of information j.
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2.3 E¢ cient Centralization
The economy is divided into L regions, each inhabited by a measure-one population of
homogeneous residents. There are then LP public goods: their indexing is expanded so
that gl;p;t is the provision of public good p in location l at time t. Politicians are drawn
independently across regions, from identical local pools.
In keeping with the classic theory of scal federalism (Oates 1972), we admit the possi-
bility of externalities in public-good provision. These externalities are measured by an index
lp 2 [0; 1]. A resident of region l derives utility
ll;p =

1  L  1
L
lp

lp > 0 (20)
from public goods provided to his own region, but he may also derives additional utility
lm;p =
1
L
p
l
p for l 6= m (21)
from public goods provided in any other region. Thus we can write individual utility
uit = ~u
i
t +
PX
p=1
" 
1  ip

ip log gl;p;t +
1
L
ip
LX
m=1
ip log gm;p;t
#
. (22)
With decentralized government, in each region a local politician with ability l;p;t inde-
pendently allocates the regional budget bDl to expenditures on local public goods x
D
l;p;t, and
residually extracts a rent in proportion Dl .
Centralization means that a single politician with ability p;t allocates the national budget
bC to expenditures on public goods xCp;t, and residually extracts a rent in proportion 
C
l . Each
region then receives public goods
gCl;p;t =
1
L
ep;txCp;t. (23)
This formulation implies that there are no economies of scale in public-good provision,
which removes the most obvious force pushing for centralization. It also means that cen-
tralization imposes a constraint of policy uniformity: gCl;p;t = g
C
p;t for all regions l. This
constraint has been highlighted, since Oates (1972), as another simple rationale for decen-
tralization (e.g., Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro 2005). Its presence
allows a direct comparison between our results and Oatess Decentralization Theorem.
The exogenous government budget is identical under centralization and decentralization,
and homogeneous across regions. Every region l has a local government budget bD under
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decentralization, or under centralization it contributes bD to the central government budget
bC = LbD. Di¤erences in tax revenues resulting from heterogeneous income across regions
would provide an immediate welfare benet of centralization, since a utilitarian welfare
function favors the egalitarian distribution of resources across regions that is implied by the
uniformity constraint.
The following proposition establishes the benecial e¤ect of centralization on political
accountability.
Proposition 2 Aggregate rent extraction is lower under centralization (C PLl=1 Dl =L) .
It is strictly lower if information is heterogeneous across regions (l 6= m for some regions
l 6= m), or if there are externalities in public-good provision (lp > 0 for some l and p).
Average e¢ ciency in providing each public good is higher under centralization (E^Cp PL
l=1 E^
D
l;p=L). It is strictly higher if there are externalities in public-good provision (
l
p > 0
for some l and p).
The rst and key result in the proposition is that if voters are heterogeneously informed
(l 6= m for l 6= m), and thus politicians are heterogeneously accountable, centralization
has benecial aggregate e¤ects on accountability. The decline in rent extraction is an in-
tuitive consequence of decreasing returns to monitoring. By joining heterogeneous regions
into a single polity, centralization leads to an overall level of political information equal to
the average  of information across regions. For regions with low voter information, this
represents a large improvement, because the increase in accountability is powerful given the
low starting point of their political accountability under decentralization. For regions with
high voter information, the deterioration is not equally stark, because the marginal value of
information is low when it is plentiful to begin with. The aggregate e¤ect of centralization
is thus an unambiguous decrease in rent extraction.
Centralization also increases political accountability if there are spillovers in public goods
across regions (lp > 0). Advantages of centralization in the presence of inter-regional exter-
nalities are present in all theories of federalism since Oates (1972). But the classic theory
only considers the benets of coordination, abstracting from any political-economy consid-
erations. Proposition 2 nds that spillovers improve incentives even if there is no need
to coordinate budget allocations because preferences are identical across regions. Political
accountability improves due to the intensive margin of electoral support.
In the election, each citizen is more likely to support the incumbent if he has proved
to be more capable than average. The intensity of popular support, however, depends not
only on the extent of ability, but also on its importance. A voter who is informed of the
incumbents poor skills may nonetheless vote for him because of his personal likability or
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ideological a¢ nity. He is, however, less likely to do so as the economic stakes in the election
rise. If there are public good spillovers, the stakes are indeed higher in a national than in
a local election. For  > 0, every voter is keener on electing a procient politician at the
central rather than at the regional level, because his ability will a¤ect public goods in all
regions, and each voter cares about them all. Thus centralization reduces the inuence of
non-policy preferences on electoral outcomes, improving the monitoring value of elections.
Through the same channel, the screening value of elections also increases. Since voters
are more concerned about the ability of a national than a local politician, in equilibrium
they select a central government whose average ability (E^p) is greater. Thanks to cen-
tralization, not only wasteful rents decline, but the e¢ ciency of productive public spending
simultaneously rises.
As in Oates (1972), decentralization can be benecial to avoid the cost of policy uni-
formity when regions have heterogeneous preferences. However, Proposition 2 establishes
new forces that tend to make centralization more e¢ cient than decentralization. Thus, the
Decentralization Theorem holds in our model only if voters are homogeneously informed
(l =  for all l). With heterogeneous information, centralization is systematically welfare
increasing.
Proposition 3 Suppose that information is homogeneous (l =  for all l).
1. If there are no externalities and preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = 0 for
all l and p), then centralization and decentralization yield identical outcomes.
2. If there are externalities and preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = p for
all l, with lp > 0 for some p), then centralization yields higher welfare than decentral-
ization.
3. If there are no externalities and preferences are heterogeneous (lp = 0 for all l and p
while lp 6= mp for some l 6= m and p), then decentralization yields higher welfare than
centralization.
Suppose that information is heterogeneous (l 6= m for some l 6= m). If preferences
are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = p for all l), centralization yields higher welfare than
decentralization.
The rst three points coincide with Oatess Decentralization Theorem. When there are
neither heterogeneity nor spillovers in information, these classic results obtain in spite of the
distortions arising from imperfect political agency.
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Without externalities, there are no benets from policy coordination. With homoge-
neous preferences, there are no costs of policy uniformity. Furthermore, in this case im-
perfect agency causes the same distortions under centralization or decentralization. Con-
stituency size a¤ects political agency through two opposing forces (Seabright 1996; Persson
and Tabellini 2000). Centralization reduces the probability that voters in any one region are
pivotal in the election. Hence a central politician is less responsive to each voters prefer-
ences than a local politician is to those of his fewer constituents. Conversely, centralization
increases the scale of political rents. When the politician allocates the larger central bud-
get instead of a smaller regional budget, re-election is more valuable. A greater value of
re-election sharpens the incentives for the central politician to perform well. Proposition
3 shows that these forces are perfectly balanced. Centralization expands the budget by a
factor L, while reducing the electoral clout of each region by a factor 1=L. The politicians
incentives are thus invariant with respect to the scale of his constituency. Rent extraction is
proportional to the government budget, as established in Proposition 1.
The second point of the Decentralization Theorem deals with the benets of policy co-
ordination. Oates (1972) assumed that local politicians maximize local welfare but cannot
cooperate. In our model, even if local politicians could cooperate across regions, they would
have no incentives to do so. Local politicians are uninterested in changing each others be-
havior. Their only goal is to signal their own ability to their own constituents, which they
do most e¤ectively by ignoring all externalities. Thus, Proposition 3 reects an endoge-
nous inability to internalize externalities under decentralization. In addition, Proposition 2
showed that the incentives and screening both improve under centralization when there are
externalities in public good provision.
Finally, the third point highlights the standard cost of a binding uniformity constraint.
Centralization is costly when regions have heterogeneous preferences, because it involves a
suboptimal allocation of expenditure across regions. Furthermore, with imperfect political
agency a binding uniformity constraint also worsens electoral screening. Politiciansskill sets
are more congruent with their constituentspreferences when they are elected locally rather
than in a single national election.
Proposition 3 concludes by showing that voter information generically modies the nd-
ings of the Decentralization Theorem in favor of centralization. With homogeneous prefer-
ences, decentralization is strictly dominated not only when there are externalities, but also
when information is heterogeneous across regions. Then it is no longer unambiguously true
that decentralization is benecial when preferences are heterogeneous: the costs of policy
uniformity can be more than o¤set by the accountability benets described by Proposition
2.
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2.4 The Distribution of E¢ ciency Gains
Proposition 2 highlighted the mechanisms through which centralization increases average
political accountability and therefore aggregate e¢ ciency. Accordingly, Proposition 3 estab-
lished that centralization is welfare-increasing from the national perspective when preferences
are homogeneous. The benets of centralization, however, are unevenly distributed across
regions. The aggregate improvement in political accountability established by 2 is also a
transfer from the more to the less informed.
Proposition 4 Suppose that preferences are homogeneous and information heterogeneous
across regions (lp = p and 
l
p = p for all l and p; l 6= m for some l 6= m). If residents
of region l are less informed than residents of region m, then centralization yields a greater
increase in the expected provision of all public goods and thus in welfare in region l than
in region m (l < m implies E
 
gCl;p   gDl;p

> E
 
gCm;p   gDm;p

for all p and E
 
uCl   uDl

>
E
 
uCm   uDm

).
If furthermore there are no externalities in public good provision (p = 0 for all p) then
region l is better o¤ under centralization than decentralization if and only if its voters are
less informed than average (l   , EuCl  EuDl ).
When voter information is heterogeneous, centralization reduces rent extraction by trans-
ferring political monitoring from the regions whose voters are more informed than average
to those with less than average information. The more informed regions are better at in-
centivizing and selecting local politicians. Conversely, the less informed regions are plagued
with rent-extracting and incompetent local governments. Centralization e¤ectively enables
them to outsource their governance to better informed voters in other regions.
The overall impact of centralization on better informed regions is ambiguous. On the one
hand, the quality of their electoral process is diluted when the constituency is expanded to
include regions with less informed voters. On the other hand, in the presence of externalities
(p > 0) all voters are more likely to act on the basis of whatever information they have in a
national election. While the dilution of informed voters blunts the monitoring and screening
ability of the electorate, externalities from central policy decisions sharpen it. The net e¤ect
is negative in the absence of spillovers, but it can be positive when they are present.
Conversely, regions with below-average information always gains from centralization.
The implicit transfer of accountability e¤ected by centralization e¤ectively entails a welfare-
increasing transfer of public funds, although every region contributes an equal amount (b)
to of the government budget and receives an identical provision of public goods (g). In fact,
the transfer is precisely a consequence of this two-sided uniformity. Under decentralization,
14
the contributions (b) are also identical, but less informed regions su¤er much higher rent
extraction and enjoy considerably lower productive government spending.
In the United States, the data conrm that political corruption varies greatly across states
(Glaeser and Saks 2006). In Oregon, less than one public o¢ cial per million inhabitants was
convicted of corruption-related crimes in an average year from 1976 to 2002. In the same
period, the corruption rate was above 5 in Alaska, Mississippi, and Louisiana.3 Proposition
4 then implies that expansion of the federal government should benet disproportionally the
states with lower political accountability, and more precisely lower voter information. The
next section tests this prediction with evidence from federal environmental policy.
Suggestive empirical support for our theoretical prediction is also provided by European
evidence. The European Union encompasses large disparities in the quality of government
across regions and member states (Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2011). Consistent with
our model, Fredriksson and Gaston (2000) conclude that an EU directive introducing uni-
form standards for packaging waste was less stringent than the existing German, Danish
and Dutch laws, but was signicantly stricter than the Greek, Irish and Portuguese require-
ments. Italy provides a striking example of large regional disparities in information and
accountability (Putnam 1993; Del Monte and Papagni 2001, 2007; Golden and Picci 2005).
Durante, Labartino, and Perottis (2011) empirical ndings on decentralization in the Ital-
ian public university system correspond perfectly to our theory. A 1998 reform transferred
responsibility for faculty hiring from the national level to the individual universities. As a
result, the quality of academic recruitment fell in provinces with lower newspaper readership.
Those with higher readership experienced no decline but at most a marginal improvement,
implying an aggregate e¢ ciency loss from decentralization.
3 Evidence from the Clean Air Act
To test the fundamental empirical prediction of our model we focus on a clear discontinuity
in U.S. environmental policy. Up to the 1960s, air pollution had been primarily regulated at
the state and local government. The year 1970 marked a dramatic centralizing intervention
by the federal government. Federal involvement rested on two pillars: the establishment
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the passage of the Clean Air Act of
1970 and subsequent amendments, which phased in national air quality standards for a set of
criterion polluters. National standardization stood in sharp contrast with the previous state-
based regulations, which had been adopted only by a few states, imposing very heterogenous
standards (U.S. Senate, 1970). We use the Clean Air Act, and the sharp regulatory shift it
3The average is 2.8 per million and the standard deviation 1.3.
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entailed, to test the distributional predictions of our model, set out in Proposition 4.
The core of our analysis considers sulfur dioxide emissions. Sulfur dioxide is a very
signicant and potentially harmful polluter. In the United States in 1970, among anthro-
pogenic sources, SO2 was predominantly released by electric utilities, which accounted for
almost 56% of the total emission (90% of which from coal-fueled power plants, and 10%
from oil-fueled ones), followed by metals processing (15%) and industrial fuel combustion
(14%), released in a variety of industrial processes involving the combustion of high-sulfur
fuels. Besides contributing to acid rain along with nitrous oxides, SO2 at relatively high
levels entails signicantly adverse health e¤ects, as it harms pulmonary and cardiovascular
functions, and, in extreme cases, may lead to premature death. Furthermore, even at much
lower levels, it severely damages crops.4
Sulfur dioxide was targeted in 1971, immediately after the passage of the Clean Air Act.
After the standards were imposed, sulfur dioxide emissions declined drastically. However,
the existence of a causal link between the legislation and the downward trend in emissions is
still debated (Greenstone 2004). We do not mean to contribute to this debate by estimating
the aggregate e¤ect of the policy shift. Our empirical investigation is restricted to the study
of the di¤erential impact of the Clean Air Act across states. In particular, we investigate the
e¤ect of citizensinformation on the di¤erential trends in emission mitigation across states
before and after the 1970 reform.
3.1 Data and Empirical Specication
Our main outcome variable is sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions for the 48 continental U.S.
states; we also consider nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions as a robustness check. We use
the same data as in Bulte, List, Strazicich (2007). They are part of a series covering the
period 1929-1999 of state-level sulfur dioxides and nitrogen oxides emissions in short tons per
capita. Bulte, List and Strazicich drew them from National Air Pollutant Emission Trends
(U.S. EPA, 1994).
We measure citizensinformation with newspapers circulation per capita. We constructed
the panel data from annual editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, which
in turn reports data from the Editor & Publisher International Yearbook. The gure is
available for all states annually, with the exception of 1974. In addition to availability,
newspaper circulation is a particularly apt measure of votersability to acquire information
about government policy. Up to the 1980s, newspapers were Americansmain source of
4Sulfur dioxide emissions have been extensively studied, both with reference to the United States (List
and Gallet 1999; List and Gerking 2000; Greenstone 2004; List and Sturm 2006; Bulte, List, and Strazicich
2007), and in cross-country analyses (Grossman and Krueger, 1995).
16
political news. Moreover, newspaper reader are acknowledged to be better informed and
more involved in politics than consumers of other media (Graber 1984; Putnam 1993, 2000;
Gentzkow 2006; Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011).
Our control variables include population, GDP, and value added from the manufacturing
sector by state. All of these are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Accounts.5
The state GDP series is only available since 1963, dictating the starting point of our sam-
ple.We consider data up to 1980, covering the rst decade since the enactment of Clean Air
Act as well as most of the prior decade, to estimate the changes in patterns induced by the
reform.
Our basic analysis is a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate of the e¤ect of information on
the reduction in emissions follosing the imposition of national air quality standards. Our
outcome measure for the pollutants concentration is the emission intensity of state GDP,
and our main regression specication is the following:
(SO2)i;t
GDPi;t
=  + Ii  Pt + Ii  St +X 0i;t  Pt +X 0i;t St + t + i +  i  t+ i;t. (24)
We include year xed e¤ect t, state xed e¤ects i, and a state-specic linear time trend
 i  t.
The main regressor of interest is information Ii. We dene information at the state level,
choosing 1970 as the reference year. As a robustness test, we also consider the time average
over the entire sample period. We use two di¤erent but related measures of information. One
is simply newspaper circulation per capita. The second is a binary variable, which equals 1
for states whose circulation is larger than the mean across states, and 0 for those below the
mean.
To study the di¤erential trend in emissions after the Clean Air Act, we consider two
interactions of Ii. First, with a dummy Pt, which takes up the value 1 if t > 1970 and 0
otherwise. This would capture a level break in the series upon the introduction of federal
emission standards. Second, with a linear time trend St, equal to t  1970 for t > 1970 and
0 otherwise. This would capture a break in the trend of emissions after the reform.
Such a gradual impact is to be expected because the regulatory transition was itself
gradual and required several years. States retained a role in the implementation and in the
enforcement of the national standards, and were allowed until 1975 to comply (U.S. EPA,
1995). Additional evidence of gradualism is provided by the number of operating monitors
reading the concentration of air pollutants, a key factor in the enforcement process, which
increased gradually throughout the 1970s (Greenstone, 2004).
5We compute population density using state land area from the 2000 U.S. Census.
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We introduce controlsX by treating them exactly like our main independent variable. We
begin by allowing a di¤erential impact of the Clean Air Act on the basis not of information
but by income. Thus, we introduce GDP per capita as a control. As with newspaper
circulation, we consider the GDP of the state in 1970, or a binary variable that equals 1 if
state GDP is above the average across states. This measure is then interacted with Pt and
St, while the baseline is absorbed by the state xed e¤ect. In our full set of control, we also
introduce in the same manner manufacturing value added per capita and population density.
3.2 Results
Before turning to our regression analysis, we can starkly visualize the main result in Figure 1.
The graph plots average sulfur emissions for two group of states: those with above-average
newspaper circulation in 1970, and those with below-average newspaper circulation. The
di¤erence-in-di¤erences emerges clearly: uninformed states have considerably higher average
emissions before 1970, and start decreasing them faster than the informed states as soon as
national emission standards are introduced by the federal government. The convergence is
gradual, with a trend instead of level break, but dramatic.
Table 1 conrms this result in our full regression specication including all controls.
Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the results when Ii is measured as a binary variable, as in
Figure 1; while in columns (2), (4), and (6) Ii is measured as a continuous variable.
The coe¢ cient on newspapers circulation per capita is statistically signicant with the
expected sign for the trend e¤ect throughout the six specications. Indeed, the time trend
appears to be the most obvious t to our natural experiment. As previously discussed, the
history of the Clean Air Act suggests that air quality standards were phased in gradually.
The binary information measure, in any case, displays a signicant level break in addition
to its signicant trend break.
The inclusion of controls does not qualitatively a¤ect the results. In fact, the estimated
coe¢ cients and standard errors show very small quantitative changes, strengthening the
signicance of the empirical support for the theoretically predicted role of information.
As a robustness test, as anticipated, we repeat the same analysis with a slightly di¤erent
measure of information. The continuous information variable is now, for each state, the
average value of circulation in the 1963-1980 period. The binary variable takes the value 1 if
the average value of circulation for the state in the 1963-1980 period exceeds the mean of the
average values for all the states in the same period. Figure 2 and Table 2 show the results.
As in Table 1, the trend e¤ect for newspaper circulation is signicant in all six specication,
and the coe¢ cients are only slightly reduced by the inclusion of control variables.
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GDP is signicant, although now as a trend e¤ect and only under the binary measure of
information; its sign is opposite with respect to the baseline specication. Combining the
twelve specications, we observe a robust e¤ect of the information variable (in trends), as
opposed to a weaker and less persistent e¤ect of GDP. Notwithstanding concerns of corre-
lation between newspaper circulation and GDP, the inclusion of the GDP in the estimation
a¤ects only marginally our estimator of the di¤erential e¤ect of information.
Overall, the results provide a clear empirical support for the notion, predicted by our
theory, that the Clean Air Act had a di¤erential impact across states, and that the di¤erence
depends on the level of information. Our results highlight that centralization improved the
quality of air in states less informed than the average.
An extensive literature has assessed the benets accruing to the population as a result
of the CAA-induced emissions mitigation. Chay and Greenstone (2005) estimate the ef-
fect of the improvement in the quality of air on housing prices. By using data on total
suspended particulate (TSP) air pollution, they nd that better quality of air causes a sub-
stantial increase in house prices. Their welfare calculation shows that the mid-1970s TSPs
regulation provided a $45 billion aggregate increase in house values.6 Chay and Greenstone
(2003) analyze the relation between air pollution and infant mortality, and nd a signicant
positive association. They estimate that a reduction in TSPs by 1 g=m3 is associated to
approximately 200 additional infants surviving to one year of age.
As a further check of the robustness of our results, we repeat the entire analysis using a
time series of emissions for nitrogen oxides NOx. Sources of nitrogen oxides di¤er remarkably
from those of sulfur dioxide. While the latter is released almost exclusively by stationary
sources (in 1970, the transportation sector accounted for less than 2% of total emissions),
the single main source for the nitrogen oxides is represented by on-road vehicles, which
accounted for 35% of total emissions in the United States in 1970, as compared to 23%
for electric utilities and 20% for industrial fuel combustion. The adverse health e¤ects of
nitrogen oxides primarily involve respiratory and cardiovascular problems, similarly to sulfur
dioxides.
National air quality standards for NO2 were imposed in 1971. However, specic standard
for NOx expressly targeting automobile emissions (consisting in national vehicle emission
limits on NOx emissions) were phased in starting in 1973 (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2000), and applied to an increasingly large portion of the United States vehicle
6As their measure of regulation, they use EPAs split of counties into attainment and non-attainment.
While the actual criteria used by EPA for the non-attainment designation are not entirely clear (Greenstone,
2004), counties whose emissions exceed the national standards are more likely to be classied as non-attaining.
In the context of the CAAAs, the non-attainment designation triggers a stricter regulation.
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eet over the years, as old cars were scrapped and replaced by new ones. 7 Changes in the
nitrogen oxides emissions materialized, after 1970, in an even more gradual way than for
sulfur dioxide. There are, therefore, reasons to expect a trend e¤ect to be visible after 1970
rather than a level e¤ect.
Figures 3 and 4 show the trend in NOx emissions intensity of GDP after splitting the
states into two groups according to whether their newspaper circulation was above or below
average in 1970. The gures suggest that a discontinuity, in this case, might be associated
with the 1972 vehicle emission limits rather than with the Clean Air Act itself. Despite this
potential concern, Tables 3 and 4 yield results that are remarkably similar to those in Tables
1 and 2 respectively, replacing the sulfur dioxide series with the one for nitrogen oxides. The
coe¢ cients on the newspaper circulation trend interactions are statistically signicant at the
1% level for all 12 specications. Again, GDP has a less clear e¤ect.
3.3 Discussion
A legitimate concern with environmental regulation is that clean air may come at the cost of
a deterioration in local economic conditions, as plants choose to relocate away from tightly
regulated areas. Previous research has shown that air quality regulation indeed a¤ects indus-
trial location and is associated with reductions in employment, investment and shipments at
the local level (Henderson 1996; Becker and Henderson 2002). In addition, tight standards
determine a signicant reduction in total factor productivity for polluting plants (Greenstone,
List and Syverson, 2011). We might then suspect that the di¤erential emission reduction fol-
lowing the Clean Air Act could be mirrored by a simultaneous di¤erential negative impact on
economic activity in the uninformed states, which recorded the largest emission reductions.
However, our analysis nds no evidence of such a di¤erential e¤ect. Figure 5 shows the
series of GDP per capita for the two groups of states, more and less informed than the average
across states in 1970. Unlike emissions, GDP per capita does not display any clear pattern
of di¤erences-in-di¤erences between informed and uninformed states before and after 1970.
A very similar argument can be made for the share of manufacturing in state GDP. Figure
6 shows its evolution for the two groups of states. Federal intervention in environmental
regulation does not seem to be associated with any di¤erential impact on the manufacturing
share by information.
The pattern of the data then suggest that the di¤erential impact of the Clean Air Act can
plausibly be interpreted according to our theoretical model. Before 1970, under state and
local governments rule, uninformed states were facing a problem of bad regulation. They
7Standards started to be applied to cars produced in the 1973 model year.
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were subject to excessively loose standards (or no standards whatsoever), to the point that,
when the federal government stepped in and prescribed tighter regulatory requirements, it
was able to do so at a very limited (and possibly nil) di¤erential cost for the states involved.
Federal standards may have been costly for the entire nation, but they do not appear to
have been costlier for the uninformed states that reaped the greatest declines in emissions.
Suggestive evidence of a problem of bad regulation by the uninformed states can also
be gleaned from direct measures of local government activity. We can look at two di¤erent
measures of regulatory inputs: expenditures by state and local governments for air quality
control, and actual regulations implemented by states and local governments before 1970.
Consistent with the public good nature of air pollution, Henderson (1996) nds that a
larger expenditure in the state on abatement activities is associated with better outcomes
in terms of air quality.8 We obtain direct state expenditure from the U.S. Department
of Commerce yearly report: Environmental Quality Control(U.S. Bureau of the Census
1971, 1980). The report publishes the yearly expenditure for air quality control for states,
counties, and cities. Since the rst published report is for the scal year 1969, this source
allows us to compare a period before the 1970 Clean Air Act to one after: we consider a
decade and compare with data for the scal year 1978. By combining state, county and city
data, we construct a measure total expenditure for air quality control regulation for each
year and state. Splitting the sample into two groups of states, based on average newspaper
circulation in 1970, we nd that in 1969 spending relative to GDP in uninformed states
was on average 71% as much as in informed states. In 1978, spending in uninformed states
rose to 86% of spending in informed states. After the introduction of uniform standards,
uninformed states closed half the gap with informed states.9 The 1970 policy shift may have
fostered a convergence, in percentage terms, of state and local government expenditures in
air pollution regulation. In line with our theoretical model and with our main empirical
result, this suggests a di¤erential e¤ect of the reform on the expenditure levels, based on the
level of citizensinformation.
As a second measure of regulatory input, we use the total number of standards imple-
mented at the state level before 1970. Our source are the hearings of the subcommittee on air
and water pollution of the United States senate (U.S. Senate, 1970). The document reports
the standards adopted by states and local governments before 1970 on ten pollutants.10 We
8He uses the Pollution Abatement Control Expenditures (PACE) series, United States Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. The series collects state-level data on rms expenditures on abatement
activity. It is available starting in 1973.
9The raw correlation between information (measured as a binary variable) and expenditure/GDP declined
from .26 (and 10% signicance level) in 1969 to 0.10 (and non signicant, with a p-value of .4963) in 1978.
10The ten pollutants are carbon monoxides, beryllium, uorides, hydrogen sulde, lead, nitrogen oxides,
sulfur dioxides, sulfuric acid, suspended particulates and total oxidants.
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count the number of pollutants that each state had regulated prior to 1970, and we then
divide the states into two groups according to the usual criterion based on newspaper circu-
lation in 1970. We nd that informed states had, on average, adopted four standards, while
uninformed states had, on average, adopted three standards only.
The document also reports the number of states that had proposed or adopted emission
standards for sulfur dioxide and for total suspended particulate as a result of the provision of
the 1967 Air Quality Act.11 We again divide the states into informed and uninformed based
on the average level of newspaper circulation in 1970, and nd that 50% of the informed
states had proposed or adopted emission standards for the two pollutants, as opposed to only
25% among the uninformed. This suggests that more informed states had more standards
before the federal intervention. The uniform national standards imposed after the Clean Air
Act would ipso facto trigger a regulatory convergence, entailing a greater improvement in
the standards of the less informed and less regulated states.
4 Centralization without Uniformity
Section 2 presented a model of political and scal centralization in which public goods are
uniformly provided across regions by the central government, and di¤erentiation only occurs
under decentralized local governments. The assumption of a uniform national policy is
natural vis à vis the empirical analysis of Section 3, since the very purpose of the 1970
Clean Air Act was to introduce uniform national standards for regulating pollution and its
abatement. Moreover, the uniformity assumption has been standard in the literature on scal
federalism since Oates (1972). Nonetheless, imposing a uniformity constraint on centralized
public-good provision is not necessarily realistic in all settings. E.g., discretionary federal
spending is not required to be homogeneously spent across states, almost by denition of
discretionality. Thus, Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) have modelled scal
federalism under the alternative hypothesis that the central government can arbitrarily vary
the provision of public goods across regions.
A straightforward extension of our theoretical framework includes both public goods
whose centralized provision is subject to a uniformity constraint, as in Section 2, and others
that the central government can instead provide in di¤erent amounts to di¤erent regions.
Letting the former constitute the set U and the latter the set D, the central government
11The 1967 Air Quality Act required that states establish air quality control regions and that the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare promulgate criteria to serve as the basis for setting emission
standards. States would then use the HEW information to set air quality standards. Under the Air Quality
Act, states retained autonomy in their decision of setting the criteria.
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budget constraint becomes
bC = rCt +
X
p2U
xCl;p;t +
LX
l=1
X
p2D
xCl;p;t, (25)
while each region then receives public goods
gCl;p;t =
1
L
ep;txCp;t for p 2 U and gCl;p;t = ep;txCl;p;t for p 2 D. (26)
The model then features two opposite distributive patterns. As established by Propo-
sition 4, uniformly provided public goods (p 2 U) imply a benet of centralization for less
informed regions. The empirical evidence in Section 3 bears out this prediction, showing
that national air quality standards adopted by the EPA beneted disproportionately states
with lower information Conversely, however, unconstrained discretional spending tends to
favor more politically inuential group. In our model, political inuence stems from in-
formation, since more knowledgeable voters provide more of the politiciansincentives. As
a consequence, better informed regions benet disproportionately from non-uniform public
goods (p 2 D), which are equally nanced by all taxpayers. This pattern is consistent with
evidence on the regional allocation of discretionary government spending during the New
Deal (Strömberg 2004). Responding to votersinformation, state governors directed more
public funds to counties with a greater share of radio listeners.
The balance between the two countervailing distributional forces depends on the relative
importance of the two types of public goods, which is summarized by the welfare weight of
public goods that the central government must provide uniformly:
U 
X
p2U
p 2 [0; 1] . (27)
Striking the appropriate balance emerges as a crucial requirement of centralization. Its
absence is perilous: the welfare gains described by Proposition 3 are no longer assured
without it. Its presence is benecial: by modulating the distribution of the accountability
gains between informed and uninformed reason, it can make centralization Pareto e¢ cient
even in the absence of externalities, despite Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 Suppose that preferences are homogeneous, information is heterogeneous,
and there are no externalities (lp = p and 
l
p = 0 for all l and p; l 6= m for some l 6= m).
1. There exists a threshold U 2
 
0; 1  C such that centralization yields higher aggre-
gate welfare than decentralization if and only if U  U .
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2. There exists a threshold 2 > 0 such that centralization with an optimal uniformity
constraint Pareto dominates decentralization if U = 1  C and 2  2.
The rst result highlights that a uniformity constraint, which creates costs of central-
ization in the classic theory of scal federalism (Oates 1972), is instead necessary for the
e¢ ciency of centralization with heterogeneously informed voters. Centralization increases
overall accountability and reduces aggregate rent extraction. When public goods are uni-
formly provided by the central government, the resulting increase in productive public spend-
ing benets the regions who need it most, because their local politicians extract higher rents
under decentralization. Indeed, uniformity induces an egalitarian inter-regional allocation,
which is precisely what aggregate welfare maximization requires. The uniformity constraint
is not binding for a benevolent central social planner when preferences are homogeneous
Instead, all public goods not subject to the uniformity constraint are provided preferen-
tially to the most informed regions. Their provision is exactly proportional to the level of
information: Cl;p=
C
m;p = l=m for all p 2 D. The resulting geographic misallocation of gov-
ernment expenditures can be more ine¢ cient than rent extraction. The share of public goods
whose centralized provision is not subject to the uniformity constraint (1   U) measures
the share of the central budget that better informed regions can appropriate. In the limit as
U ! 0, uniformed voters certainly su¤er more under centralization, when their taxes are
channeled to public spending in better informed regions, than under decentralization, when
they are defrauded by rent-extracting local politicians. The welfare losses of redistribution
across heterogeneously informed voters loom larger than those of imperfect political agency.
As evidence of such welfare costs, Ponzetto (2011) has shown that knowledge asymmetries
across voters can account for a Pareto ine¢ cient protectionist bias of trade policy.
Proposition 5 highlights that the uniformity constraint can mediate between e¢ ciency
and redistribution. If it can be set optimally at the constitutional table, centralization may
be made Pareto dominant. Better incentives for ruling politicians create an aggregate surplus
that can be shared across regions. For 1   U  C , any region with more than average
information (l > ) prefers the budget allocation induced by centralization. Gaining control
of centrally provided goods not subject to the uniformity constraint (1  U) is worth more
than a decrease in rent extraction to Dl < 
C . For C  1   U , any region with less
than average information (l < ) prefers the budget allocation induced by centralization.
Reducing rent extraction from Dl > 
C is worth more than the loss of control over distributive
goods (1  U). Hence, if 1  U = C centralization induces a Pareto dominant allocation
of expenditures.
Beyond the budget allocation, centralization inevitably improves the selection of politi-
cians in less informed regions, and worsens it in more informed ones. Centralization can be
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Pareto e¢ cient so long as the resulting gains and losses are small, because politiciansability
is not too variable (low 2). Then the main problem in political agency is rent extraction
(moral hazard) rather than the screening of more skilled politician (adverse selection). In
this case, centralization can always provide a Pareto e¢ cient improvement in accountability.
5 Conclusions
Political accountability and the quality of government vary across regions within a country
like the United States, and across member states of international organizations like the
European Union. In this paper, we have shown that such regional di¤erences imply that
centralization increases political accountability.
Our model emphasizes the role of di¤erences in votersinformation. Rent-seeking politi-
cians have better incentives when their constituents are more informed about the provision
of public goods. We have shown that electoral discipline has decreasing returns. Therefore,
a central politician answerable to the whole national electorate extracts lower rents than
a collection of local politicians, some monitored tightly by well-informed voters and some
loosely by poorly-informed constituents. Hence, we have found that centralization is ben-
ecial whenever voter information is heterogeneous across regions. This result can help to
explain the steady growth of the federal government over the history of the United States,
and the sharp increase in the scope and extent of the powers of the European Union since
the 1970s (Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht 2005).
Our model also predicts distributional consequences of centralization when regions have
di¤erent levels of information, even without di¤erences in income. When the central gov-
ernment provides public goods uniformly across the nation, the benets of centralization are
monotone decreasing in voter information. We have tested this prediction by analyzing the
di¤erential impact across U.S. states of the Clean Air Act of 1970. Beforehand, environmen-
tal regulation was largely in the hands of states and local governments. Beginning in 1970,
the federal government took charge and started introducing uniform national standards. We
have found signicant and robust evidence of di¤erences-in-di¤erences. Consistent with our
theoretical model, centralization of environmental policy induced a di¤erential decline in
pollution in less informed states, relative to better informed ones.
Our nding that centralization benets the least informed regions hinges on our focus on
uniform policies, both in our baseline model and in empirical evidence from pollutant emis-
sion standards. In our theoretical framework, we have shown conversely that if the central
politician can di¤erentiate local public good provision across regions, he targets the most
informed. While uniform policy entails a transfer of accountability from the informed to the
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uninformed, discretionary spending reects a transfer of power from the uninformed to the
informed. Thus we have identied the balancing role of a uniformity requirement for central-
government policies. Some uniformity is necessary for centralization to be welfare increasing.
A carefully calibrated constraint can even ensure the Pareto e¢ ciency of centralization.
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A Derivations and Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The budget allocation and the expectation of the incumbents ability are derived in the body
of the text. The cumulative distribution function of ^p;t is
	t 
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jj
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p=1
jp"p;t. (A1)
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F" (   ") f" (") d", (A2)
where F" (") is the cumulative distribution function of "p;t and f" (") its probability density
function. SinceZ 1
 1
"F" (   ") f" (") d" = E ["F" (   ")] < E"E [F" (   ")] = 0, (A3)
an increase in 
PJ
j=1 jj
j
p induces an increase in ^p in the sense of rst-order stochastic
dominance.
A.2. Centralization and Decentralization
Under centralization, Proposition 1 implies that rent extraction is
C =

1 + 2~
 1
, (A4)
and the expected ability of a central politician is
E^Cp =
2
L
LX
l=1
lpl. (A5)
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The relative shares of each local public good are
Cp =
1
L
LX
l=1
lp
l

. (A6)
Welfare in region l is
EuCl = log
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L
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 
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, (A7)
and aggregate welfare is
WC = log
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Under decentralization, Proposition 1 implies that rent extraction is
Dl =
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1 + 2~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and the expected ability of a local politician is
E^Dl;p = 2

1  L  1
L
lp

lpl. (A10)
The relative shares of each local public good are
Dl;p =
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1  L 1
L
lp

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Welfare in region l is
EuDl =
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and aggregate welfare is
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A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
A.3..1 Rent Extraction
Aggregate rent extraction is lower under centralization if and only if
C  1
L
LX
l=1
Dl , (A14)
which can be written
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for
f (x)  1
1 + 2~x
(A16)
a strictly decreasing and strictly convex function of x > 0:
f 0 (x) =   2
~
1 + 2~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
2~
2

1 + 2~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Thus
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The rst inequality follows from convexity by Jensens inequality and holds strictly if l is
heterogeneous across regions. The second inequality follows from monotonicity and holds
strictly if lp > 0 for some l and p.
A.3..2 Ability
Average e¢ ciency in providing public good p is higher under centralization if and only if
E^Cp 
1
L
LX
l=1
E^Dl;p, (A19)
which can be written
LX
l=1
lpl 
LX
l=1

1  L  1
L
lp

lpl. (A20)
The right-hand side is weakly lower than the left-hand side, and strictly lower if lp > 0 for
some l and p.
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
A.4..1 The Decentralization Theorem
Suppose that information is homogeneous (l =  for all l). Then under centralization
C =

1 + 2~
 1
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2
1
L
LX
l=1
lp, and 
C
p =
1
L
LX
l=1
lp. (A21)
while under decentralization
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2
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1. If there are no externalities and preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = 0 for
all l and p), then
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
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2. If there are externalities and preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = p for all
l, with p > 0 for some p), then under centralization
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and
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Under decentralization
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30
and
WD = log b+ log
 
1  Dl

+
PX
p=1
p
 
E^Dl;p + log 
D
l;p

. (A31)
Centralization achieves the optimal allocation of productive expenditures, while decen-
tralization does not unless p is homogeneous across goods.
Thus welfare is lower under decentralization due to increased rent extraction, lower
government e¢ ciency, and also misallocation of expenditures across public goods unless
p is homogeneous across goods.
3. If there are no externalities and preferences are heterogeneous (lp = 0 for all l and p
while lp 6= mp for some l 6= m and p), then under centralization
WC = log b+ log
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while under decentralization
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Decentralization achieves the optimal allocation of productive expenditures, while cen-
tralization does not. Moreover, decentralization achieves a better screening of politi-
cians
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because for each public good p
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unless lp = p for all l.
A.4..2 E¢ cient Centralization
Suppose that preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = p for all l). Then under
centralization
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
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and
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Under decentralization
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1. The welfare cost of rent extraction falls with centralization:
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which can be written
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a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of x > 0:
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The rst inequality follows from convexity by Jensens inequality and holds strictly if
l is heterogeneous across regions. The second inequality follows from monotonicity
and holds strictly if p > 0 for some p.
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2. Average ability increases under centralization for all public goods, as proved in Propo-
sition 2:
3. Centralization achieves the optimal allocation of productive expenditures, while decen-
tralization does not unless p is homogeneous across public goods.
Thus centralization increases welfare whenever information is heterogeneous (l 6= m for
some l 6= m) or there are externalities in the provision of public goods (p > 0 for some p).
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that preferences are homogeneous (lp = p and 
l
p = p for all l). Then public-good
provision in region l is
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under decentralization, and
gCl;p;t =
1
L
xCp;t exp
 
^Cp

= Cp b
D
 
1  C exp  ^Cp  (A49)
under centralization.
The proof of Proposition 3 has established that @Dl;p=@l = 0 and @
D
l =@l < 0. Recall-
ing the proof of Proposition 1, ^Dl;p is increasing in l in the sense of rst-order stochastic
dominance, so @E exp
 
^Dl;p

=@l > 0. Since gCl;p;t is identical for all regions, it follows that
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Similarly for residentswelfare
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If furthermore thee are no externalities (p = 0 for all p) then under decentralization
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If and only if l   then Dl  C , E^Dl;p  E^Cp , EuDl  EuCl , E exp
 
^Dl;p
  E exp  ^Cl;p,
and EgDl;p  EgCl;p, with joint strict inequalities.
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A.6. Proof of Proposition 5
The allocation under decentralization is una¤ected by aU < 1. Aggregate welfare is
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From Proposition 1, rent extraction under centralization is
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and the expected ability of a central politician is
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p. (A56)
The relative shares of each local public good are
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and aggregate welfare is
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Then aggregate welfare is greater under centralization if
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Region l gains from centralization if
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The function
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has a unique minimum
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and convexity
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Hence if
U =
2~
1 + 2~
= 1  C (A65)
the left-hand side of condition A61 is a convex function of l 2 [0; 1] with minimum at l = .
This also proves that
U < 1  C . (A66)
Moreover, let
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Then for
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centralization Pareto dominates decentralization for U = C . Any region with l =  is
always indi¤erent between the two. Regionm is also indi¤erent if 2 = 2, and strictly prefers
centralization otherwise. Any regions with l <  or l > m strictly prefer centralization.
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Table 1 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on SO2 Emissions
Dependent variable: SO2 Intensity of State GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper 1.322** -1.370 2.120*** 1.932 1.871*** 1.611
 after 1970 (0.554) (3.782) (0.740) (4.602) (0.632) (4.218)
Newspaper 0.448*** 3.853*** 0.400** 3.884*** 0.425*** 3.078***
 t since 1970 (0.117) (0.836) (0.156) (0.992) (0.134) (0.905)
State GDP -1.715** -0.141 -1.433* -0.138
 after 1970 (0.714) (0.099) (0.775) (0.103)
State GDP 0.104 -0.001 -0.014 -0.022
 t since 1970 (0.149) (0.020) (0.168) (0.021)
Manufacturing 1.354** 0.307**
 after 1970 (0.560) (0.155)
Manufacturing -0.235** 0.070**
 t since 1970 (0.111) (0.033)
Pop. density -1.561*** -0.002***
 after 1970 (0.532) (0.001)
Pop. density 0.465*** 0.001***
 t since 1970 (0.104) (0.000)
State xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Measures Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont.
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.968 0.967
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote signicance respectively at the 10%*, 5%**,
and 1%*** condence level. Emissions are from the EPA; newspaper circulation per capita from the Statistical
Abstract of the United States; state GDP, manufacturing value added and population density from the BEA
Regional Economic Accounts. For all four independent variables, binary measures in odd-numbered columns
are dummies for a 1970 value above the mean across states; continuous measures in even-numbered columns
are 1970 values.
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Table 2 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on SO2 Emissions
Groups Dened by Time Averages
Dependent variable: SO2 Intensity of State GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper 0.492 -1.128 0.773 1.331 0.852** 1.234
 after 1970 (0.533) (3.962) (0.478) (4.690) (0.433) (4.255)
Newspaper 0.593*** 3.994*** 0.399*** 3.570*** 0.386*** 2.330***
 t since 1970 (0.111) (0.871) (0.098) (0.994) (0.091) (0.888)
State GDP -0.481 -0.103 -0.132 -0.101
 after 1970 (0.478) (0.092) (0.483) (0.096)
State GDP 0.334*** 0.018 0.285*** 0.009
 t since 1970 (0.098) (0.018) (0.100) (0.019)
Manufacturing 0.240 0.261*
 after 1970 (0.452) (0.140)
Manufacturing -0.027 0.069**
 t since 1970 (0.098) (0.030)
Pop. density -1.349*** -0.002***
 after 1970 (0.351) (0.001)
Pop. density 0.183*** 0.000***
 t since 1970 (0.069) (0.000)
State xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Measures Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont.
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.967 0.967 0.968 0.967 0.968 0.967
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote signicance respectively at the 10%*, 5%**,
and 1%*** condence level. Emissions are from the EPA; newspaper circulation per capita from the Statistical
Abstract of the United States; state GDP, manufacturing value added and population density from the BEA
Regional Economic Accounts. For all four independent variables, binary measures in odd-numbered columns
are dummies for a 1963-1980 state average above the mean of state averages; continuous measures in even-
numbered columns are 1963-1980 state averages.
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Table 3 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on NOx Emissions
Dependent variable: NOX Intensity of State GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper -0.060 -2.524 -0.225 -5.114 -0.156 -4.153*
 after 1970 (0.218) (1.724) (0.345) (3.154) (0.300) (2.455)
Newspaper 0.177*** 1.872*** 0.188*** 2.602*** 0.163*** 2.183***
 t since 1970 (0.044) (0.360) (0.069) (0.635) (0.060) (0.492)
State GDP 0.354 0.110 0.602 0.135
 after 1970 (0.338) (0.077) (0.401) (0.086)
State GDP -0.024 -0.031** -0.067 -0.041**
 t since 1970 (0.068) (0.015) (0.081) (0.016)
Manufacturing -0.017 -0.074
 after 1970 (0.189) (0.083)
Manufacturing 0.060 0.067***
 t since 1970 (0.037) (0.016)
Pop. density -0.695*** -0.001**
 after 1970 (0.201) (0.000)
Pop. density 0.089** -0.000
 t since 1970 (0.039) (0.000)
State xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Measures Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont.
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.950 0.951 0.950 0.952 0.951 0.955
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote signicance respectively at the 10%*, 5%**,
and 1%*** condence level. Emissions are from the EPA; newspaper circulation per capita from the Statistical
Abstract of the United States; state GDP, manufacturing value added and population density from the BEA
Regional Economic Accounts. For all four independent variables, binary measures in odd-numbered columns
are dummies for a 1970 value above the mean across states; continuous measures in even-numbered columns
are 1970 values.
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Table 4 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on NOx Emissions
Groups Dened by Time Averages
Dependent variable: NOX Intensity of State GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newspaper -0.032 -2.408 -0.206 -5.284 -0.061 -4.032
 after 1970 (0.204) (1.754) (0.387) (3.252) (0.328) (2.521)
Newspaper 0.206*** 1.980*** 0.272*** 3.296*** 0.241*** 2.702***
 t since 1970 (0.041) (0.368) (0.078) (0.651) (0.066) (0.502)
State GDP 0.299 0.120 0.549 0.129
 after 1970 (0.387) (0.085) (0.451) (0.083)
State GDP -0.113 -0.055*** -0.162* -0.059***
 t since 1970 (0.078) (0.017) (0.091) (0.016)
Manufacturing -0.303 -0.057
 after 1970 (0.221) (0.068)
Manufacturing 0.075* 0.058***
 t since 1970 (0.044) (0.013)
Pop. density -0.522*** -0.001**
 after 1970 (0.175) (0.000)
Pop. density 0.088*** -0.000
 t since 1970 (0.034) (0.000)
State xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year xed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Measures Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont. Bin. Cont.
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.950 0.951 0.951 0.955 0.951 0.957
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote signicance respectively at the 10%*, 5%**,
and 1%*** condence level. Emissions are from the EPA; newspaper circulation per capita from the Statistical
Abstract of the United States; state GDP, manufacturing value added and population density from the BEA
Regional Economic Accounts. For all four independent variables, binary measures in odd-numbered columns
are dummies for a 1963-1980 state average above the mean of state averages; continuous measures in even-
numbered columns are 1963-1980 state averages.
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Figure 1 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on SO2 Emissions
Sources: Emissions are from the EPA, newspaper circulation from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, and GDP from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 2 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on SO2 Emissions
Groups Dened by Time Averages
Sources: Emissions are from the EPA, newspaper circulation from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, and GDP from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 3 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on NOx Emissions
Sources: Emissions are from the EPA, newspaper circulation from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, and GDP from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 4 Information and the E¤ects of the Clean Air Act on NOx Emissions
Groups Dened by Time Averages
Sources: Emissions are from the EPA, newspaper circulation from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, and GDP from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 5 Information and State GDP per Capita
Sources: Newspaper circulation is from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and GDP from the BEA
Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 6 Information and the Share of Manufacturing in State GDP
Sources: Newspaper circulation is from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, GDP and value added
in manufacturing from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
49
